Commentary for Bava Metzia 6:7
הא לא קשיא רבי חייא כרבי מאיר סבירא ליה דאמר עדים מחייבין אותו קרבן מק"ו
— This objection is not valid: R. Hiyya is of the same opinion as R. Meir, who says that witnesses do make it necessary for the offender to bring an offering, [and he infers it] by means of a <i>Kal wa-homer</i>. For we learnt:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ker. 11b. Cf. Jeb. 87b. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
Tosafot on Bava Metzia
R’ Chiya holds like R’ Meir [who says that witnesses can also obligate one to bring a karban]. Let us remind ourselves that we are discussing
A) R’ Chiya’s kal v’chomer that the testimony of witnesses is stronger than one’s own admission because their testimony can obligate him to pay fines, which his own admission cannot accomplish. If his own admission can obligate him to swear upon the fifty zuz that he is denying, witnesses’ testimony that he owes fifty zuz, which is stronger than his own admission should also obligate him to swear on the other fifty zuz.
Penalties
Kal, His admission: No
Chomer, Witnesses: Yes
Oath
Kal, His admission: Yes
Chomer, Witnesses: Certainly
The Gemara challenges this kal v’chomer by saying that in a way one’s mouth is stronger than witnesses because it can obligate him to bring a karban, which witnesses cannot do. Thus the perceived kal his admission - is not actually kal, because it has the power to accomplish what the chomer - witnesses cannot do.
The Gemara responds that R’ Chiya follows the opinion of R’ Meir who says that witnesses can in fact obligate one to bring a karban. Thus his admission remains - kal - in comparison to witnesses’ testimony.
R’ Meir’s ruling is also kal v’chomer based:
B) If the testimony of witnesses is strong enough to execute a person, it should certainly be strong enough to obligate him to bring a karban, which is a much lighter punishment than death.
Note, that this is a shortened version of the type of kal v’chomer A) mentioned earlier in the Gemara. We are not drawing a comparison from one’s admission to witnesses’ testimony. We are simply saying that since witnesses’ testimony can establish liability for capital punishment, it should certainly be capable of establishing liability for a karban.
R’ Meir’s kal v’chomer: Witnesses can effect capital punishment. Therefore, witnesses should certainly effect liability for a karban.
What is emerging is that R’ Chiya is teaching us kal v’chomer A) which is based on what is derived from kal v’chomer B). Since kal v’chomer B) teaches us that witnesses can obligate one to bring a karban, one’s own admission remains kal by comparison and we can now learn from A) the first longer kal v’chomer that witnesses’ testimony, which is the relative chomer, should obligate an oath.
Tosfos wonders why we cannot directly apply the underlying basis of kal v’chomer B) to the issue of witnesses obligating a defendant to swear. The chomer of kal v’chomer B) is that witness’ testimony has the strength to effect capital punishment. We could also say: If the testimony of witnesses can establish liability for capital punishment, it should certainly establish an obligation to swear.
Tosfos’ propsed kal v’chomer: Witnesses can effect capital punishment. Therefore, witnesses should also effect an obligation to swear. If you ask: If so, that R’ Chiya follows R’ Meir, who holds that witnesses can obligate one to bring a karban, which is based on kal v’chomer B), let us say that very same kal v’chomer of R’ Meir to learn that the testimony of witnesses can obligate an oath like so: If by their testimony [witnesses] can establish liability for capital punishment, they should certainly establish liability for an oath which is relatively lenient as compared to capital punishment? Why does R’ Chiya in his kal v’chomer draw from the comparison of one’s admission, which cannot cause him to pay fines to the testimony of witnesses, which can obligate him to pay fines? It seems that the direct kal v’chomer from witnesses establishing liability for capital punishment is more direct and to the point.
We can answer: Because this kal v’chomer using the strength of witnesses’ testimony to establish liability for capital punishment as the basis for proving that their testimony should also obligate an oath, can be challenged as follows: For what can you prove from the witnesses’ strength to bring about capital punishment, where the defendant is punished for committing the crime that they are directly testifying about? Can the same be said in regard to obligating the defendant to swear, where he will swear about the fifty zuz of the claim that he denies which is not supported by the testimony of the witnesses, as the Gemara says later (at the end of this page)? It is only by comparing the testimony of witnesses to one’s own admission where we can draw a kal v’chomer which proves that the testimony of witnesses can establish an obligation to swear just as one’s own admission can establish such liability, despite the fact that he will be swearing about the unsupported portion of the claim.
A) R’ Chiya’s kal v’chomer that the testimony of witnesses is stronger than one’s own admission because their testimony can obligate him to pay fines, which his own admission cannot accomplish. If his own admission can obligate him to swear upon the fifty zuz that he is denying, witnesses’ testimony that he owes fifty zuz, which is stronger than his own admission should also obligate him to swear on the other fifty zuz.
Penalties
Kal, His admission: No
Chomer, Witnesses: Yes
Oath
Kal, His admission: Yes
Chomer, Witnesses: Certainly
The Gemara challenges this kal v’chomer by saying that in a way one’s mouth is stronger than witnesses because it can obligate him to bring a karban, which witnesses cannot do. Thus the perceived kal his admission - is not actually kal, because it has the power to accomplish what the chomer - witnesses cannot do.
The Gemara responds that R’ Chiya follows the opinion of R’ Meir who says that witnesses can in fact obligate one to bring a karban. Thus his admission remains - kal - in comparison to witnesses’ testimony.
R’ Meir’s ruling is also kal v’chomer based:
B) If the testimony of witnesses is strong enough to execute a person, it should certainly be strong enough to obligate him to bring a karban, which is a much lighter punishment than death.
Note, that this is a shortened version of the type of kal v’chomer A) mentioned earlier in the Gemara. We are not drawing a comparison from one’s admission to witnesses’ testimony. We are simply saying that since witnesses’ testimony can establish liability for capital punishment, it should certainly be capable of establishing liability for a karban.
R’ Meir’s kal v’chomer: Witnesses can effect capital punishment. Therefore, witnesses should certainly effect liability for a karban.
What is emerging is that R’ Chiya is teaching us kal v’chomer A) which is based on what is derived from kal v’chomer B). Since kal v’chomer B) teaches us that witnesses can obligate one to bring a karban, one’s own admission remains kal by comparison and we can now learn from A) the first longer kal v’chomer that witnesses’ testimony, which is the relative chomer, should obligate an oath.
Tosfos wonders why we cannot directly apply the underlying basis of kal v’chomer B) to the issue of witnesses obligating a defendant to swear. The chomer of kal v’chomer B) is that witness’ testimony has the strength to effect capital punishment. We could also say: If the testimony of witnesses can establish liability for capital punishment, it should certainly establish an obligation to swear.
Tosfos’ propsed kal v’chomer: Witnesses can effect capital punishment. Therefore, witnesses should also effect an obligation to swear. If you ask: If so, that R’ Chiya follows R’ Meir, who holds that witnesses can obligate one to bring a karban, which is based on kal v’chomer B), let us say that very same kal v’chomer of R’ Meir to learn that the testimony of witnesses can obligate an oath like so: If by their testimony [witnesses] can establish liability for capital punishment, they should certainly establish liability for an oath which is relatively lenient as compared to capital punishment? Why does R’ Chiya in his kal v’chomer draw from the comparison of one’s admission, which cannot cause him to pay fines to the testimony of witnesses, which can obligate him to pay fines? It seems that the direct kal v’chomer from witnesses establishing liability for capital punishment is more direct and to the point.
We can answer: Because this kal v’chomer using the strength of witnesses’ testimony to establish liability for capital punishment as the basis for proving that their testimony should also obligate an oath, can be challenged as follows: For what can you prove from the witnesses’ strength to bring about capital punishment, where the defendant is punished for committing the crime that they are directly testifying about? Can the same be said in regard to obligating the defendant to swear, where he will swear about the fifty zuz of the claim that he denies which is not supported by the testimony of the witnesses, as the Gemara says later (at the end of this page)? It is only by comparing the testimony of witnesses to one’s own admission where we can draw a kal v’chomer which proves that the testimony of witnesses can establish an obligation to swear just as one’s own admission can establish such liability, despite the fact that he will be swearing about the unsupported portion of the claim.
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